



Department of State

TELETYPE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Junklay DATE 10/9/80

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TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED ☒ RELEASABLE ☒

RELEASE DENIED ☐

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

EXDIS REVIEW _____

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 (ISO)

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0 060610Z APR 75 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 100

C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 6023

ENDIS

Z.O. 11682: CDS

TACS: PPRZ, EAD, MASS, MOPS, PINT, PINS, CD, US, OREP

SUBJ: MEETING OF STAFFOEL MOOSE AND NEISSNER WITH

ACTING PRESIDENT SAUKHAM KHVOY

1. MORNING APRIL 6 I TOOK MESSRS. MOOSE AND NEISSNER TO CALL ON ACTING PRESIDENT SAUKHAM KHVOY. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION SAUKHAM KHVOY MADE IMPASSIONED PLEA FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID IN ORDER TO GAIN TIME TO WORK OUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM. IF THIS AID WERE NOT FORTHCOMING, KHVOY WOULD HAVE TO RAISE WHITE FLAG AND KC WOULD ENTER PHNOM PENH WITH PROBABLE BLOOD BATH RESULTING.

2. SAUKHAM KHVOY SAID THAT BEST FEASIBLE SOLUTION IN THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE FOR KHMER PEOPLE TO "INVITE" SIHANOUK TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA. IF THIS WERE DONE KC WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO REMAIN OUTSIDE OF PHNOM PENH AND PERMIT RELIEF SUPPLIES TO COME INTO PHNOM PENH BOTH BY AIR AND UP THE MEKONG RIVER.

3. WHEN MOOSE ASKED WHETHER KC WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A SCENARIO, SAUKHAM KHVOY THOUGHT THAT PUBLIC NATURE OF SUCH AN APPEAL TO THE PRINCE TO RETURN WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR KC TO SACOTACE.

4. SAUKHAM KHVOY STRESSED THAT IF A MAJORITY OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE FAVORED SUCH A SOLUTION HE PERSONALLY WOULD BE WILLING TO STEP ASIDE IF SIHANOUK SO REQUESTED. HE WOULD ALSO OBTAIN THE DEPARTURE OF ALL OTHER PERSONALITIES UNACCEPTABLE TO

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THE PRINCE. IN REPLY TO MOOSE'S QUESTION WHETHER FANK COMMANDERS WOULD GO ALONG WITH THIS TYPE OF SCENARIO, SAUKHAN KHUY OPINED THAT HE COULD CONVINCE MOST OF THOSE WHO COMMAND THE TROOPS, AND THOSE WHO OPPOSED SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE NEUTRALIZED.


5. THE ACTING PRESIDENT ASKED THAT HIS OFFER BE CONVEYED BY MESSRS. MOOSE AND NEISSNER TO THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AS A SIGN OF HIS SINCERITY ABOUT FINDING AN EARLY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE TRAGIC CONFLICT WHICH HE SAID HAS GONE ON TOO LONG. HE PLEADED FOR CONGRESS TO HELP THE GKR GAIN THE NECESSARY TIME SO THAT AN ORDERLY SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND WHICH PRESERVES SOME FREEDOMS FOR THE KMER PEOPLE AND PREVENTS THE IMPOSITION OF A TOTALLY COMMUNIST REGIME ON CAMBODIA.

6. SAUKHAN KHUY DID NOT KNOW HOW ALL OF THIS COULD BE CONVEYED TO SIMANOUK AND THE KHMERS ON THE OTHER SIDE, BUT HE HOPED THAT THE GREAT POWERS WOULD HELP HIM, PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. HE PLEADED THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT JUST WALK AWAY FROM CAMBODIA. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE CHINESE ARE CONTINUING THEIR STRONG SUPPORT TO HANOI AND THE KC, AND THAT IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO ABANDON CAMBODIA WITHOUT A SOLUTION IT WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF ASIA.

7. MOOSE IS DRAFTING SEPARATE MESSAGE REPORTING HIS CONVERSATION TO SFRC WHICH DEPT WILL BE ASKED TO TRANSMIT ON IMMEDIATE BASIS TO ADDRESSEE. DEAN

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISQ-00 SSQ-00 /026 W
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INFO CINCPAC NIACI IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T PHNOM PENH 6093

~~EXIS~~

Elyah Kelly
Sept. 18, 79

CINCPAC FOR ADMIRAL G

SECSTATE FOR THE SECRETARY

USSAG FOR GENERAL BURNS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, MOPS, PINS, CD, US
SUBJECT: EAGLE PULL
REF: CINCPAC 092243Z APR 75

1. REFTTEL TRANSMITS ADMIRAL GAYLER'S RECOMMENDATION THAT WE INITIATE EAGLE PULL NOT LATER THAN DAYLIGHT 12 APRIL. MY CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER ON THE GROUND IN PHNOM PENH, GENERAL PALMER, IS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ADMIRAL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. I AGREE WITH BOTH OF THEM THAT THE LONGER WE DELAY THE EVACUATION OPERATION THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO EXECUTE AND THE GREATER WILL BE THE JEOPARDY IN WHICH WE WILL BE PLACING AMERICAN LIVES.

2. IN LINE WITH THE D AND PROMPT INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION HERE, THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY PICTURE IN AND AROUND PHNOM PENH AS OF THE MORNING OF APRIL 10. I REQUEST IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD PLAN TO INITIATE EAGLE PULL AT DAYLIGHT 12
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APRIL.

3. BEGINNING ON THE WEST, AT ROUTE 4, AND CONTINUING COUNTER-CLOCKWISE AROUND THE PERIMETER, HERE ARE THE AREAS OF GREATEST THREAT AND PENETRATION:

A. AT A POINT DUE NORTH OF DEY CHAN THE ENEMY IS TWO KILOMETERS FROM KANTAIK AMMUNITION DEPOT, OR WITHIN 600M MORTAR RANGE.

B. SOUTHEAST OF TUOL LEAP ALONG THE RAILROAD TRACK TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 81ST BRIGADE VACATED THEIR NARROW SECTOR ON THE FRONT LAST NIGHT AND WITHDREW 3 TO 4 KILOMETERS TO SAMRONG. THE GENERAL FRONT LINE AT THIS POINT WAS 8 KILOMETERS FROM THE AIRPORT. IF THE ENEMY EXPLOITS THIS GAP HE COULD MOVE IN MUCH CLOSER.

C. NORTHEAST OF TUOL LEAP AND ALMOST DUE NORTH OF POCHENTONG, THERE IS A 1.5 KILOMETER GAPS BETWEEN THE 20TH AND 45TH BRIGADES. IT HAS EXISTED FOR SEVERAL DAYS; NO ONE IN FANK HAS BOTHERED TO TRY TO CLOSE IT. THE ENEMY WITH LITTLE EFFORT COULD BE WITHIN 5 KILOMETERS OF THE AIRPORT IN THIS AREA.

D. FARTHER TO THE NORTHEAST ON THE 84 EAST-WEST GRID LINE, 2 TERRITORIAL FORCE BATTALIONS JUST IN FROM KOMPONG SEILA RETREATED 800 METERS, CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY THE KC, WHO ARE HERE A FULL 2 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE NORTH DIKE AND ONLY 6 KILOMETERS FROM THE EDGE OF THE PHNOM PENH QUARTER OF TUOL KAIK.

E. ON THE PENINSULA BETWEEN THE TONLE SAP AND MEKONG RIVERS THE ENEMY LAST NIGHT ATTACKED BY HEAVY WEAPONS (700 ROUNDS ARE CLAIMED, THOUGH THIS IS PROBABLY EXAGGERATED) A TERRITORIAL BATTALION, INFLECTING 10 KILLED AND 50 WOUNDED. THE FRONT IS NOW 8 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE 80 GRID LINE, OR OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE CITY, BUT THERE IS LITTLE THERE TO CONTAIN THE ENEMY WHEN HE DECIDES TO DRIVE SOUTH.

F. ON THE EAST BANK OF THE MEKONG OPPOSITE THE CITY, TERRITORIAL UNIT POSITIONS WERE LOST ON THE BANK AT THE 77 E-W GRID LINE DIRECTLY EAST OF THE ROYAL PALACE. FROM THAT POINT THE ENEMY HOLDS 2.5 KILOMETERS OF THE BANK EXTENDING TO THE EAST. IN ADDITION, ANOTHER POSITION WAS GIVEN UP LAST NIGHT 1.5 KILOMETERS EAST OF THE RIVER SLIGHTLY TO THE NORTH OF THE BANK AREA IN ENEMY HANDS. BOTH OF THESE ENEMY LOCATIONS ARE WITHIN 4 KILOMETERS OF THE CITY'S WATERFRONT. YESTERDAY 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE ROUNDS WERE LANDING IN THE WATER JUST SHORT OF THE WATER FRONT. TODAY THEY COULD BE WELL WITHIN THE CITY ITSELF.

G. ON THE SOUTHEAST IN THE AREAS BETWEEN THE BASSAC AND MEKONG RIVERS AND WEST OF THE BASSAC (THE FANK 2D AND 1ST DIVISION FRONTS),

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FANK HAS IN THE PAST TEN DAYS LOST EVERY INCH OF GROUND WON IN HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN JULY AND DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR. THEY HAVE ENTIRELY LOST ANLONG CHEN ISLAND AND HAVE GIVEN UP SUFFICIENT GROUND ON THE WEST BANK OF THE BASSAC TO PLACE THE ENEMY WITHIN 5 KILOMETERS OF PHNOM PENH SUBURB.

N. OUR ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION INDICATES A MASSING OF 40 TO 45 KC BATTALIONS (EARLY ESTIMATE - 11 TO 13,000 MEN) NOW IN THE AREA OPPOSITE THE 1ST AND 2D FANK DIVISIONS. THEY ARE THE EASTERN REGION 1ST AND 2D KC DIVISIONS AND THE KC SPECIAL REGION 11TH AND 12TH BRIGADES. FANK 1ST AND 2D DIVISION FORCES OPPOSING THEM ARE EXTREMELY WEAK, DISPIRITED, POORLY DUG IN, AND POORLY LED. THE EXPECTED ENEMY PUSH IN THIS SECTOR SHOULD BE SWIFT WHEN IT IS LAUNCHED.

4. IN ASSESSING THE HEAVY WEAPONS SIDE OF THE ABOVE THREAT, THE FOLLOWING RANGES MIGHT BE BORNE IN MIND: 105 MM HOWITZER - 11.1 KM; 107 MM ROCKET - 7.5 TO 8 KM; 75MM RECOILLES RIFLE - 6.5 KM; 120MM MORTAR - 5.7 KM; 81 OR 82MM MORTAR 3 TO 3.5 KM; 60MM MORTAR - 2 KM.
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